This is a page from LEOPOLD REPORT Visitors from 50 countries every month


Part 2

Read PART 1 of this article series, where we presented
the disinformant Professor Robert Harkavy.

Read PART 3 of this articles series, where we presented
the disinformant Professor Oswald LeWinter.

Read PART 4: The three disinformants made a joint attack on the Palmemurder investigation

Read PART 5: Disinformants in the Palme Murder Case Tied to the Reagan Administration’s Propaganda Institute; Boss was Ambassador to Sweden.

In Swedish


Disinformant #2: Arms dealer William Herrmann

He took part in the Iran-Contra affair,
but lied to the Palme Investigation Group
about his background when he for two years
played his disinformation game.
The Security Police stated:
"Nothing is known about William H"

John Anderson - Tony Widing - Anders Leopold

(Leopold Report 100510) William Herrmann operated as a disinformant from 1991 to 1993. He occupies a lot of space in the investigation of the assassination of Olof Palme. His information about his background and fabulous military career was pure bluff. In fact, he was one of the CIA's major arms dealers. The CIA and the FBI made sure that Herrmann was kept out of all congressional hearings about the so-called Iran-Contra affair.

When the police investigators tried to obtain information about him, the Security Police (SÄPO) told them (according to the Swedish Government's Palme Commission - GK), that "nothing was known about William H ". Was SÄPO fooled by the FBI - or was it a deliberate joint deception of the Palme Investigation Group (PU)?

In a 1986 interview with the Sunday Telegraph (London), William Herrmannn said he was 50 years old and born in Poland. He lived in Little Falls, New Jersey. He became a US citizen in 1956, and served in the US military until 1967, when he claimed had reached the rank of colonel. He claimed that he through the most recent decade (i. e. approx 1976-86) had been a CIA agent in Iran and Iraq and also worked for the FBI.

We have little confidence in these data. For example, he would then as 31-year-old in 1967 have been one of America's youngest colonels ever with a brilliant General career ahead.
Gary Sick, who served in the US Navy for 24 years, was a Middle East analyst who worked for the National Security Council (NSC) under Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan (two weeks). He writes in his book October Surprise- America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan(1991:153) that Herrmann in1964 established an air cargo company operated from the John F. Kennedy International Airport. This company carried out occasional contract work for the CIA. This meant that Herrmann was not formally employed by the CIA, but was commissioned to undertake operations, indicating that the company was a cover for US intelligence. This work grew in scale, and came in the late sixties and into the seventies to include other secret operations on behalf of the CIA. In the early seventies, Herrmann started a Frankfurt company that specialized in international arms operations, in which the Swedish Bofors later was involved.

Concealed his Background

Herrmann concealed this background entirely from PU. Instead, he stated that he in the late sixties had been assistant military attaché in Iran (GK p. 441). He also told PU that he during that time had made many contacts in Iran. However, Gary Sick writes that he did not have these contacts until the eighties, when he became a friend of a former minister under the Shah.

On the other hand, it was probably useful for him to have these relations inside Iran in the eighties. At that time, the Americans needed such contacts because of the embassy hostages and the development in Iran (hostages were also taken in Lebanon, but the Americans managed to have them released after negotiations in which the payment probably included supply of arms).

Obviously, Herrmann's air cargo business took place in understanding with the CIA and other intelligence services that he worked for. At the time, several armed conflicts were in progress in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa, supported by the US through arms supplies. Some of the arms deliveries went directly from US manufacturers and storages. At other occasions, it was necessary to use suppliers in other countries such as Israel, South Africa, Chile, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Portugal - and Sweden through Bofors. The deals often involved several countries to enable the US to bypass end user regulations. It was on this market that Herrmann, his firm, and his business contacts operated.

If Herrmann truly had made the incredible career he boasted, Gary Sick would certainly have paid attention to it. But there is not one word about such a career in Sick's book. Nor is there any trace of such a career in the records from the 1986-89 Congressional hearings/investigations about Herrmann and his activities in the Iran-Contra affair, or the 1991-92 October Surprise hearings/investigations. Unfortunately - and typically - it is not possible to find any CV covering Herrmann's alleged military career.

This already shows that Herrmann was unreliable, and lied when his missions required it. He also lied extensively to PU when he described his glorious military career (GK p. 441). The purpose was obviously to establish his own credibility and impressive knowledge, when he presented his allegations for PU.

But he did not dare to try this hoax when he finally was interrogated by the Congress in connection with the 1991-92 October Surprise investigation.

This is a man who had been sustained by the CIA nearly his entire adult life (since he had been on the payrolls of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defence through decades, and they had commissioned him to run a lucrative arms trade and transportation service). This is a man who in July 1991 started a disinformation operation by "revealing" to PU that the CIA was behind the assassination of Olof Palme (GK p. 441-3). If he truly had come up with this information at his own initiative, to really help the Palme murder investigators, we wonder from where he intended to receive his income for the rest of his life - and where he intended to hide.

The October Surprise Scandal

William Herrmann was among the disinformants who were used against journalists and authors after the first allegations about October Surprise, the incredible story of how the Reagan campaign, led by the future Vice President George H. W. Bush and the future CIA Director William Casey, negotiated with Iranians on massive weapons sales, if they would delay the release of the 52 Americans held hostage in Tehran until after the presidential election. Meanwhile, incumbent President Jimmy Carter had made an enormous effort to get the hostages home before the 1980 election, to facilitate his re-election.

However, leaders of the Reagan election campaign met with Iranian leaders in Europe several times during a short period before the election. 52 US citizens were forced to endure horrendous conditions, placed in small groups in different places in Tehran and its environs for about three extra months. But the hostages were homebound only minutes after the USA's newly elected President Ronald Reagan had been inaugurated at January 20, 1981.

October Surprise was of course denied by all participants. Today, however, there is extensive evidence that this huge scandal actually happened (presented i. a. by journalist and author Robert Parry in his book Secrecy and Privilege - Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq (Parry 2004).

The exposure of the Iran-Contra affair started in November, 1986. Initially, the focus was at illegal US weapons deliveries to Iran. Questions were raised about whether the supplies had commenced already in 1979-80 after the negotiators of the Reagan campaign had made a secret arms-for-hostages agreement.

President Jimmy Carter and his advisers, as well as numerous journalists and writers, now started working to clarify whether the Iranians in 1980 really had been promised arms, ammunition, spare parts for military aircrafts, helicopters, etc., as well as new weapons systems to counter the threat from the modern Iraqi army (which in turn had been built up by the US!), in return for holding the hostages back and releasing them at the "right" time.

The debate peaked around 1987-88 when Reagan was to complete his tenure as President and his Vice President George H. W. Bush was running for president. Numerous people with dubious backgrounds as arms dealers etc. appeared in media, alleging they participated in the meetings between the Reagan election campaign team and the Iranians. The accusers' claims included that they had travelled with the team members, that they had participated in the meetings, and that they had been commissioned to "cleaning up" after the meetings. Some also said they had been involved in arms supplies. But there were no central CIA employees or people from the Reagan team among the accusers. Most of them eventually turned out to have low credibility, and it was not hard to reveal some of them as disinformants. As a consequence, the election staff of the Democratic Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis did not dare to act on the allegations of Bush's role in the Iran-Contra affair that instigated the October Surprise allegations, since doing this could backfire.

Who was it, then, who inserted these disinformants into the game, and why? If the intention only was to lure the Democrats into a trap, in order to weaken their position before the election, it could have been done in a simpler and less risky way than bringing the October Surprise matter back to life. Any other issue could have been used at any time! It seems far more likely that the Republicans had to cover up the scandal, which had been smouldering for long, and could flare up at any time. The disinformants were sent out not only because of the election campaign, but also to prevent another major Watergate scandal. Since it easily could be proved that they lied about certain aspects of the October Surprise matter, and they could be "revealed" as criminals, the Democrats and others who took their allegations seriously could be discredited. This way, they could extinguish the smouldering fire and take home points in the presidential election.

We assume that the Democrats understood this, since they continued their efforts to find the truth about October Surprise. They were rewarded in the summer of 1991, when the October Surprise matter finally was taken seriously by large and influential American news media, led by ABC/Nightline, and the matter was raised in Congress. R Spencer Oliver, Chief Counsel for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called people who claimed to have participated to congressional hearings, and started investigating these as well as Republicans and bureaucrats that were involved by witnesses. Oliver had extensive experience from the Watergate scandal, and he was a feared investigator (Parry 1993).

Neither Oliver's report (US Senate 1992) nor the report from an investigation team in the House of Representatives (US House of Representatives 1992) came to the bottom of the matter; hence they did not dare to draw any conclusions. In the process, several disinformants and their lies and general unreliability were "revealed" to prove that October Surprise never happened. It should be remembered that Reagan and Bush in 1980 were the main actors in this scandal, and that Bush now in 1992 was up for re-election.

October Surprise is as such not important for our analysis of the Palme investigation. Our point is that there were disinformants in the Palme investigation that in parallel operated as disinformants also in connection with the October Surprise allegations. This shows where these disinformants belonged, and who their clients were.

Disinformation against Media

The typical with the October Surprise story is that journalists and authors - just like in the Palme investigation and similar cases - are approached and misled by disinformants. The media people are therefore faced with a double task: To account properly for the event and simultaneously detect disinformation. However, they are rarely able to identify the disinformation strategy of an intelligence service. The main reason is that the intelligence services operate under the principle of making clandestine (illegal and secret) operations deniable.

One can therefore conclude that the information from several of the sources that appear after a state controlled operation include planted disinformation; hence it must be treated with great care.

William Herrmann was among the disinformants who were deployed against journalists and writers working on the October Surprise matter, and even against the Congress. Just like in the Palme investigation, his stories were long and complex, and are as such of no interest in this connection. The main point is that the man who so assiduously tipped and informed the Palme investigators was revealed as a disinformant in the US Congress. In the GK report, an investigator is quoted saying that "his [Herrmann's] information lacked credibility; they were based on speculations and fabrications."

Parry (1993) thoroughly reviewed how the House of Representatives investigation team questioned and revealed approximately 10 named so-called "allegators", including William Herrmann. Additional information can be found in Parry (2004) and, of course, in both Congress reports. For example, Herrmann is specifically named in Parry (1993:289):

"The House team repudiated other October Surprise 'witnesses' as well. None was telling the truth about Republican-Iranian contacts, the House investigators concluded. Yet, most of the so-called 'allegators' - including pilot Heinrich Rupp [..], American arms dealer William Herrmann, and [..] - stuck by their stories about Casey's supposed hostage initiatives."

Of course they did - if they had admitted that they had lied to Congress, they would have been taken into custody immediately.

Not surprisingly, it was found that much of what Herrmann said actually was true. This is a good example of the methodology used by intelligence services when they make use of disinformation, deception, cover-ups, smoke screens, etc. If the disinformant is to succeed, he must have a story that at first look consists of credible and verifiable details. The disinformation, which is harder to verify, is included in between all this correct information. Depending on the nature and purpose of the operation, disinformation will be designed for later discovery, or not. If the intention is to kill the entire story later, the disinformation must be designed accordingly. However, if the history is to be kept alive, the false details must also be designed in a manner that makes it impossible to repudiate them later.

Two Different Kinds of Disinformation

When - as in the Palme investigation - the objective is to keep the investigators busy and mislead them as much and as long as possible, the disinformation is not designed for later repudiation. This makes it far more demanding to reveal the disinformant. It requires completely different working practices and control procedures.

Hence, Herrmann has acted as disinformant with two entirely different approaches in Washington and Stockholm. In Washington, the intention was to burn him later as a liar (to discredit his story), while in Stockholm, he was not to be unmasked (to confuse PU and keep it busy) until at a convenient time. This shows the complexity of this issue, and what kind of expertise the investigators of a statesman's murder should possess.

Deeply Involved in Irangate

Although it is not entirely clear what role Herrmann played in October Surprise beyond being a disinformant, it is obvious that he was qualified to be among those that were responsible for arms deliveries to Iran (he was an arms dealer, had his own shipping company, had Iranian contacts, etc).

It is also quite clear that he participated in the later arms shipments to Iran. This appears from his own statements to PU (GK p. 443), which there is no reason to doubt. He was a friend of one of the illegal exporters in Sweden, the Swedish arms dealer Sven Klang, who was exposed in connection with the Bofors affair. These supplies were stopped by Prime Minister Olof Palme. There is every reason to believe that Herrmann played a role both in connection with the arms shipment from Sweden, contact with the receiving end in Iran, and especially contact with the leadership of the Iran-Contra operations in the White House.

These arms shipments may have been part of the October Surprise deal. However, this evolved into the later illegal arms sales that were intended to finance the Contra war in Nicaragua. This is what subsequently became known as the Iran-Contra affair - where the Iranian part often is called Irangate. The day-to-day coordinator of the entire Iran-Contra affair was Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North.

As evidence that Herrmann was involved in arms trade, and had the necessary skills to help PU with the murder investigation, he claimed that he had been arrested and convicted in London in connection with Irangate and the Oliver North affair (GK p. 441-42). He had talked his way to PU via the Danish police in Roskilde, whose conclusions were that he "made a solid and credible impression".

Sting Operation in London

The story around Herrmann's arrest in London was, in fact, not related to Irangate or to Oliver North at all. Rather, it was related to the FBI and the CIA that were undertaking a major sting operation in Europe. To PU, Herrmann had converted his participation in this sting operation to something that gave him the necessary entrance ticket to the Palme murder investigation. This is how disinformants operate on behalf of the secret services.

What actually happened in London appears from various other sources:

Herrmann was arrested in London at 17 May, 1985, after three million dollars in counterfeit notes was found in his hotel room (Parry 1993:133). During his trial, he explained that he had acted as an infiltrator in a counterfeiter gang on assignment from the FBI (Honegger 1989:278). In an interview with author Joe Bainerman (Bainerman 1992:240), Herrmann said he had infiltrated the Belgian terrorist group Action Directe on behalf of the FBI. They, too, had a counterfeiting department that allegedly had turned the false money over to Herrmann for whitewashing.

This is consistent with what the FBI agent John Mencer said during the trial, that Herrmann was informer for the FBI and had provided information on international terrorists and espionage (Sunday Telegraph 1986b).

That he worked for the FBI has since been confirmed in Parry (1993:133), which reveals information that the FBI's own telexes show that Herrmann days before the arrest was in contact with two FBI agents - one in New Jersey and one at the US embassy in London - about how the money was to be delivered and received. Thus, we find that the entire operation was a sting operation and it was a part of the design that he was arrested by Scotland Yard and sentenced to five years imprisonment (Parry 1993:133). This sting operation and "arrest" occurred in May 1985. The Iran-Contra scandal broke in November 1986, and investigations of people involved began a month later. Herrmann was obviously one of those Congress wanted to hear.

It is unclear where Herrmann was from he was arrested at 17 May, 1985 until his sentence was announced in March, 1986, after three weeks of trial in London. According to his own statements, he was imprisoned in England from March, 1986, to February, 1987, when he was transferred to a federal prison in the US where he - also as stated by himself - remained until December 1988 (Bainerman 1992:241).

Kept away from Congress

Hence; when the Iran-Contra scandal broke in November, 1986, Herrmann had already been convicted and imprisoned in England. All circumstances indicate that he was detained in England rather than extradited to the US to serve his sentence, which would have been normal procedure. This was an extraordinary decision, and a British official was convinced it was to prevent that he was put before the Congress (Sunday Telegraph, 1986a).

When he still was officially extradited to the US in February 1987, it may suggest that his superiors knew that Congress had lost interest in this "counterfeiter, liar, and criminal arms dealer".

To PU, however, Herrmann claimed that he was placed in a "camp" in the US and released in September, 1989 (GK p. 443) - that is, nine months later than according to his previous statements in the United States. This is not the only example that he presented divergent time data. What we still know for certain is that he was transferred to a federal prison in the US (Parry 1993:133).

The delayed "extradition" was highly convenient, since Herrmann as well as his superiors had a strong interest in keeping him away from the Congress hearings on Iran/Contra.

Orchestrated by CIA, MI5, MI6

Herrmann stated himself (GK p. 442) that the whole affair was orchestrated by the CIA in cooperation with MI5 (the British Security Service) and MI6 (the British Secret Intelligence Service) in order to get rid of him. We are in full agreement with him about the first part, but not with the objective. Herrmann "forgot" to tell PU that this was done entirely with his consent.

Hence; our point is also here - similar to what Herrmann's true role was in the October Surprise - not what was true or untrue, but to expose Herrmann's extensive cooperation with the FBI and the CIA.

"Nothing Known!"

According to GK (p. 444), at 24 October, 1991, PU asked the Swedish Foreign Ministry to try to obtain personal information about Herrmann, and determine whether his information, in particular the London story, was reliable. The Foreign Ministry forwarded the question to the Security Police (SÄPO) that replied that "nothing was known about William H".

The purpose of this request was, of course, that the Foreign Ministry should carry out investigations in the US and the UK. SÄPO took over, and must have contacted the FBI as well as British authorities. Its response indicates that the authorities in both countries simply lied to SÄPO, since both were deeply involved in the 1985-1986 sting operation, arrest, etc., and obviously had information about Herrmann's activities in their files. Also, US authorities were involved in all Herrmann's arms deliveries that later (1986-1988) were uncovered and became the subject of congressional hearings. On top of this, the newspapers had written extensively about Herrmann on both sides of the Atlantic. For example, Pittsburg Post Gazette (25 January, 1989, p. 7) quoted a spokesman for the American prison system who said that the extradition of Herrmann had been delayed "due to the sensitivity and high publicity characteristics of this case".

Moreover, by this time several books featuring Herrmann and these events had been published (e. g. Honegger 1989, Sick 1991 and various Iran-Contra-books).

The FBI Lies - and who else?

Hence; the FBI must have lied about the answer "nothing was known about William H " - assuming it really came from the FBI - which is evidence that Herrmann still was protected in 1991, when he began his disinformation campaign against PU.
It is remarkable that SÄPO did not understand that this was a lie, since it is quite clear that it was aware of Herrmann's link with the Swedish arms dealer Sven Klang and the illegal Bofors arms deals with Iran, which were exposed by Prime Minister Palme already in 1985, one year ahead of his murder. This suggests that there was a common agreement between the FBI and SÄPO that it "was best" to deny all knowledge about him to PU.
Even the role of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, which first received the request, is questionable. One would believe that it had been informed about the publicity around Herrmann from its embassies in Washington and London.

CIA Lead Closed

In the original design of the strategy, Herrmann would have been exposed by the FBI as "not credible" at some convenient time. This would prove that his contributions to the CIA lead could be discarded. Why this in fact did not happen, and why the FBI went into the risky business of lying in order to protect Herrmann, will be further investigated in Part 4 of this series.

On the other hand, it was rather convenient that, according to GK, an anonymous person in the summer of 1992 approached PU, stating that he was well informed of the case, and that he personally doubted Herrmann's allegations.

How could someone outside PU with its high secrecy level know that Herrmann had submitted information, and if so, what? It could hardly be anybody but himself or one of his allies, such as Professor Robert Harkavy. GK declared both Harkavy and Herrmann as disinformants.

Read Part 1 of this article series, where we presented the disinformant Robert Harkavy.

According to GK (p. 444), Harkavy functioned as a sort of messenger for the arms dealer Herrmann:

"Finally, in April, Robert H contacted PU, stating that William H. was willing to come to Stockholm and provide additional information, provided PU paid his travel expenses. PU declined."

Of course. The Palme investigators no longer had any confidence in the disinformant William Herrmann.

Good News

This was certainly good news for Harkavy and Herrmann, as well as their patrons. The disinformation strategy had succeeded. PU had been put to useless work for five years, the CIA lead had been was closed, and disinformation strategy as part of a state controlled operation had not been disclosed.

This shows not only that Harkavy and Herrmann knew each other, but also that they were cooperating operationally against PU in the same period. Harkavy ran his disinformation scam from January, 1990, until March, 1995, and Herrmann from July, 1991, until April, 1993.

We have here shown that Herrmann in several other respects behaved as a professional disinformant and agent for the CIA. He was deeply involved in the Iran-Contra complex and had protection from the FBI and English authorities, and perhaps also from the Swedish Security Police SÄPO.

We have now connected two of the persons declared as disinformants by GK. In the next article, we will present the third - Professor of Literature Oswald LeWinter.


Honegger, Barbara (1989): October Surprise. Tudor Publishing Company.

Bainerman, Joel (1992): The Crimes of a President. SPI Books.

Parry, Robert (1992): Fooling America. William Morrow & Co. Inc.,

Parry, Robert (1993): Trick or Treason. The October Surprise Mystery. Sheridan Square Press.
Parry, Robert (1996): The October Surprise X-files. The Media Consortium Inc.

Parry, Robert (1999): Lost History. The Media Consortium Inc.

Parry, Robert (2004): Secrecy and Privilege. Rise of the Bush dynasty from Watergate to Iraq. The Media Consortium, Inc.

Pittsburgh Post Gazette (1989): January 25, page 7.

Sick, Gary (1991): October Surprise. America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan. Times Books.

Sunday Telegraph (1986a): Article about the extradition of Herrmann, as quoted by Honegger (1989).

Sunday Telegraph (1986b): Interview with William Herrmann as quoted by the San Francisco Chronicle December 29, 1986.

The Swedish Government's Palme Commission (GK) (1999): The Criminal Investigation after the Murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme. SOU 1999:88. (Granskningskommissionen: Brottsutredningen efter mordet på statsminister Olof Palme.)

US House of Representatives (1993): Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages in Iran in 1980. January 3.

US Senate (1992): The 'October Surprise' Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the Hostages Held in Iran". Report of the Special Counsel. 19. November.


William Herrmanns (William H)
Summary of the report from the Swedish Government's Palme Commission (GK) regarding Herrmann's contacts with the Palme Investigation Group (PU).

In July, 1991, Mogens E contacted PU from Denmark. Bill (William H) had been asked by journalists about his knowledge of the murder of Olof Palme. He had decided to talk with PU first, and wanted to be interrogated in Denmark. The hearing was also attended by an investigator who also worked with the Bofors scandal [Swedish arms sales to Iran].

William H said that he in January, 1988, had received a request from Swedish television to assist in disclosing the truth about Robot 70 [part of the Bofors arms sales] in Iran. He had declined.

He stated that he had previously been a military officer with the rank of colonel. He had worked in military intelligence and the CIA, where he had been a contract agent until 1985. His task had primarily been to obtain information on other countries' weaponry. This had taken him into the arms trade, and in the late 60's, he had for three years been an assistant military attaché in Iran.

Israel was the country that shipped arms to Iran, sometimes behind everybody's back. According to William H., Israel did this in order to finance its intelligence services. Later, the US shipped arms via Israel to Iran. It was claimed that this was not offensive equipment, only spare parts. This way, many NATO weapons warehouses were emptied.

In May 1985, William H. had been arrested in London after 300,000-400,000 counterfeit bank notes [no currency mentioned by GK] had been discovered in his hotel room. The bank notes were found during a search, and the whole event was, according to William H, orchestrated by the CIA in cooperation with MI5 (the British Security Service) and MI6 (the British Secret Intelligence Service) in order to get rid of him. He was sentenced to 22 months in prison. He had learned of the assassination of Olof Palme several months after it happened, and immediately thought this was the work of the CIA and Israeli intelligence, since Sweden supplied weapons to Iran through Bofors.

After the prison term, he was sent to a "camp" in the US. He was released in September, 1989. Subsequently, he had obtained information about the Palme assassination. The order to murder Olof Palme probably came from Washington. In August-September, 1985, the CIA commissioned Israeli intelligence to murder Palme precisely because of the Bofors contract with Iran and the supply of 150 field howitzers. The Israeli intelligence service had hired a Palestinian to carry out the assassination. Swedish intelligence was probably also involved in the assassination, since Olof Palme was without bodyguards at the night of the murder.

After the interview, the police (PU) was to contact William H's representative in Sweden, the lawyer Henning S, who would submit relevant names.

Answering a specific question about whether William H was familiar with the so-called P2 telegram, Licio G [Gelli], Philip G [Guarino], Rasine [cover name for LeWinter], Rosine [cover name for LeWinter], or Oswald W [LeWinter], he stated that he only had heard the name Oswald W before, and that this individual was working within the Israeli intelligence service.

PU contacted Henning S and received some names, including "Nir" and "Mansoar M". Nothing was said about which of them that was the perpetrator or who gave the order for the assasination.

On one occasion, William H said he had been in contact with the journalist Peter S, who had told him that Licio G was considered an international arms dealer linked to the Mafia. Peter S had a full dossier on Licio G and the so-called P2 telegram that had been sent by him. Allegedly, it had the wording: "The Swedish tree is to be felled. Regards to our good friend Bush (referring to then Vice President George Bush Senior)".

During the autumn (1991), PU tried to identify the persons behind the names provided by Henning S. The Danish registry found an Iranian named Mansour M who had arrived in Denmark in September, 1984. The person had visited Sweden for a period, but was now living in Copenhagen.

A document dated October 24, 1991 is registered in the file. The document [from PU], addressed to the Foreign Ministry, contains a brief description of the case, after which questions are asked about who William H is, whether the data concerning the London story are true, and whether his information otherwise is credible. The answer came from the Security Police, which stated that nothing was known about William H.

In the summer of 1992, an anonymous person approached PU. He was well informed of the case and stated that he personally doubted the information submitted by William H. He had, according to the informer, certain interests in Sweden, and he could therefore wish to "deal with" information supplied.

In August the same year, PU was informed that a member of the Israeli government, Amiram Nir, had perished in a plane crash in Mexico in 1988.

Finally, in April 1993, Robert H. [..] contacted PU with the information that William H was willing to come to Stockholm and provide additional information, providing PU paid his travel expenses. PU declined the offer.

Detective Inspector Roland S, who was the investigator who in the summer of 1991 went to Denmark to attend the questioning of William H., has in discussions with the Commission stated that William H. was a bit of an "Ivan type". His information was not credible; it was based on speculations and fabrications.

GK writes (page 699):

The suspected disinformants are so numerous that they constitute a practical problem in the investigation. While it is clear that many informants fall into this category, it is, however, very difficult with certainty to identify a person as a disinformant in each individual case. [..] With these reservations, it can, however, with good reason be concluded that the majority of the informants in this group, [such as] William H. (CIA section), Robert H (Middle East), [..] more or less should be considered disinformants.

Read PART 1 of this article series, where we presented
the disinformant Robert Harkavy.

Read PART 3 of this articles series, where we presented
the disinformant Oswald LeWinter.